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INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTY: ANOTHER
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Claudia Caruthers
Abstract: In-situ and intra-national preservation of cultural property is threatened
by a highly remunerative international black market. Despite the existing nexus of both
domestic and international laws drafted to halt illicit trafficking in cultural property,
black markets, such as ones in Southeast Asian art and artifacts, are thriving. This
Comment examines whether the existing web of laws and regulations serve, in fact, to
foster, rather than discourage, the continuance and growth of the art black market.
Likening the destruction of rare cultural resources to the destruction of scarce natural
resources, this Comment uses Garrett Hardin's game theory tragedy of the commons
scenario to illustrate the relational between art laws and the black market in cultural
property. Finally, this Comment hypothesizes that the only workable solution may lie in
declaring certain cultural property rights inalienable.
Keep Michael Jackson. Give us back Phanom Rung.
- lyric by Thai rock band Carabao
l
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1988 the Bangkok Post advanced a dramatic theory to
explain the disappearance in the early 1960s of a mammoth temple lintel
2
from Thailand. The piece was removed from the Phanom Rung Temple, an
ancient Khmer religious site built under an incrementalist building project
spanning the Ninth to Thirteenth Centuries. Dismembering the lintel from the
temple proper and transporting it out of the temple compound must have been
formidable tasks: the lintel weighs one ton and the temple is in a remote area
along the Cambodian border. During the 1960s, the Thai living in the area
did not possess the technological means either to dislodge or transport the
lintel from the temple.
There is, however, an alternate candidate for removing the lintel.
During the same period, American military were stationed in the area to
provide logistical air support to U.S. troops engaged in the Vietnam War. It
' Sheila Teff Plundering ofArtfacts SweepsAsia, CM IAN Scl. MoNrroR, Or. 15, 1992, at 12.
2 "Lintel" is the architectural term for a weight-supporting horizontal crosspiece over an opening
such as a doorway, window, etc.
3 Siriporn Buranaphan, Thailand Seeks Return ofAncient Temple Sculpture From US., REUTERS
LIBR. REP., Feb. 12, 1988.
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is most probable that Americans, employing military equipment, used
explosive devices to blast the lintel off of the temple body and then airlifted it
out of the area by helicopter.4
James Alsdorf, then-Chairman of the Art Institute of Chicago
(hereinafter the "AIC"), purchased the piece and in 1967 lent the lintel to the
AIC. In 1971, Thailand, which had registered the temple as a national
archeological site in 1935, initiated renovation and restoration of the temple.
The Thai Embassy requested Alsdorf return the stolen piece but Alsdorf
refused, demanding the Thai government produce evidence the lintel was
indeed stolen. Alsdorf, apparently unconvinced by the Thai arguments,
donated the work to the AIC in 1983. Finally, in 1988, when restoration of
the temple was nearly complete and Thailand was preparing to re-open it for
religious pilgrimages, the Thai government again approached the AIC about
the lintel. This time, however, the Thai government altered its position from
requesting the return of the lintel to demanding that the AIC repatriate the
piece as stolen. The Thai government offered a "gift" to the AIC of some
Ban Chiang pottery to help temper the museum's loss.
The AIC, claiming that this type of precedent would create a slippery
slope of copycat claims from other nations, refused to return the lintel unless
the Thai government "exchanged" the sculpture for another artifact of similar
value. 5 The Thai, insulted by this aggressive stance, withdrew their "gift"
offer, stating "[t]he sculpture belongs to Thailand. The Institute has no right
to bargain with us." 6 Both sides became deadlocked. In 1988, the Elizabeth
Cheney Foundation intervened in the dispute, providing the AIC with the
capital to purchase another equivalent Thai piece to replace the lintel. The
lintel, which had become the "toast of Thailand and an international cause
celebre" has now been restored to the temple, where it is visited "daily" by
"bus loads of tourists ... and monks."
7
This account may undoubtedly strike many readers as riddled with
inequities. The Western legal tradition has a long history of securing near-
4 This account echoes the poignant contemporary testimony of a British observer who witnessed
removal of the Elgin Marbles in 1803. The Elgin Marbles are a collection of marble figures and a frieze
removed from the Parthenon and transported to England where they now remain, despite repeated
requests by Greece for their repatriation. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELsEN, 1 LAW, ETHics,
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 4-14 (2d ed. 1987).
5 Buranaphan, supra note 3.
6 Id. The lintel and its repatriation galvanized widespread support among Thai as "emblem[s] of
Thai cultural pride." Tefft, supra note 1, at 12.
7 Teffi, supra note 1, at 12.
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absolute rights in property, 8 and of frowning upon cases that lead to
forfeitures, random redistributions and unequal exchanges. However, the
Thai case perfectly personifies the stances often taken by parties in cultural
property repatriation negotiations. The theft of religious art and wanton
pillaging of temple sites, as well as the stealing of other artistic, historic and
scientific treasures, is rampant in many of the less wealthy areas of the
world. 9 Many of the less affluent nations in the Asia-Pacific region are
unique however because, in addition to being victims of a growing amount of
illicit trade,'0 they also contain some of the preeminent purchasing markets
for stolen art.1  Moreover, the market for Asian art is presently being
promoted by art dealers, especially by art auction houses. 12 Within the Asian
art market, "Southeast Asian art has finally overtaken Chinese paintings as
the hottest acquisition among budding connoisseurs."' 3  Thus, the goal of
halting the illicit traffic in cultural property is of keen importance for the
Southeast Asian region.
This Comment will first present a brief background to the field of
cultural property and broadly outline the framework of international and
national laws and policies to protect and preserve that property. Acquisition
policies among U.S. museums and art auction houses will also be briefly
discussed. This Comment will then unpack the relationship between the
8 In 1762, Adam Smith stated: "Justice means [to] prevent the members of a society from
encroaching on one another['s] property, or seizing [sic] what is not their own." ADAM SMITH, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 (R. Meek, et al. eds. 1978).
9 Paige L. Margules, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Export of Cultural
Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 609
(1992); Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifact and Antiquities, 36 How. L.J. 17 (1993);
Jonathan Kandell, Bare Ruined Choirs: A Western Hunger for Gothic Madonnas and Renaissance Angels
Has Fueled the Sacking of Eastern European Churches and Limited Attempts to Save Them, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1994, at 10.
'0 There is "an accelerating trade in stolen artifacts sweeping Southeast Asia" according to Thai
and Western art experts. Teffl, supra note 1, at 12.
11 One salient example is Thailand. In spite of its high-minded stance regarding its own cultural
property rights, Thailand presently hosts a thriving illicit trade in Cambodian and Burmese cultural
property: "Political turmoil in Burma and years of war and upheaval in Cambodia have flooded the black
market in the Thai capital of Bangkok with priceless artifacts plundered from Angor Wat and other
architectural jewels in the region." Id. "An increasingly affluent Asian middle class showed that it was
timely for Christies to cater to the new and different tastes of collectors in the region." Michael
Richardson, Revived Self-Identity Spurs Art Sales, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 10, 1996. See also Leong
Weng Kam, Indonesian Art Heads Home, SINGAPORE STRAIT TIMES, Oct. 4, 1996, available in 1996
WL11725631.
12 Hammering Asia, THE ECONOMIST, v.332, 95-96 n.7881, Sept. 17, 1994. See also Richardson,
supra note 11.
13 Leong Weng Kan, supra note 11. "[Tihe total value of South-east Asian artworks sold at
auctions... is expected to cross the $20 million mark easily by year's end-more than double last year's
$9.8 million." Id.
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increasingly strict international regulatory regime and the exploding black
market trade in antiquities. Specifically, it will assess these two apparently
conflicting but, in reality, highly interdependent forces by using game theory
analysis in combination with principles embedded in the theory of the
"tragedy of the commons." 14  This Comment will criticize the ideologies
which are marbled through the current arenas of cultural property, its extra-
national collection and the requests for its repatriation. Lastly, it proposes a
radical reform regarding the liquidity and fungibility of cultural property,
recommending that cultural property rights should be understood as
inalienable.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining Cultural Property
Although the term "cultural property" usually evokes the visual arts-
specifically, painting, sculpture and architectural elements-the legal
definitions for cultural property are more broad and the trajectory is toward
increasing liberality of meaning. Until 1995, the common definition for the
term cultural property was found in the 1970 United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organizations (hereinafter "UNESCO") Convention
on Cultural Property.
15
More recently, the 1995 International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law Convention (hereinafter "UNIDROIT"), 16 motivated by concerns
that the limited 1970 UNESCO Convention list might be interpreted as
exhaustive, provided a more elastic definition. The 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention relaxed the 1970 UNESCO Convention categories by requiring
14 WILLAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 39-42 (2d ed., 1994) (discussing Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)).
5 See the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. In
addition to regulating property of artistic interest, the Convention provisions also define cultural property
as rare specimens or collections of fauna, flora, minerals, and anatomy; objects of paleontological interest;
property of historical interest (with "history" encompassing scientific, technological, military and social
histories); objects culled from archeological excavations; dismembered architectural elements; antiquities
(defined as 100 or more years old); ethnological objects; rare manuscripts; books and publications; old
postage; historical archives; and furniture and musical instniments 100 or more years old.
16 See Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics ofAntiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative,
95 COLuM. L. REv. 377, 379 (1995).
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only that cultural property have religious or secular significance and/or
importance for archeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science.
17
Those who define cultural property tend to insinuate into its meaning a
preferred doctrinal perspective. This tendency has led to "numerous and varied
definitions given to cultural property... [and a] lack of uniformity... " in the
literature.' 8 This Comment is no exception. For its purposes, the taxonomy
of cultural property encompasses a wide range of human endeavors, allowing
for diversity of form. That is, non-dimensional forms of cultural property-
for example, the Japanese notion of artisans as "living national treasures" or
the pan-indigenous notion that oral songs and non-notated music can be
tribal/clan/individual property-are completely reasonable "entities" subject
to cultural property rights and obligations. Similarly, ideological purchases
on the reconfiguration and representation of "the past" also fall under the
rubric of cultural property (noting that many traditional Native American
tribal histories are very fluid, defying the dualistic categories of Western
historicity.) The semiotic vehicles by which a culture's heritage is
transmitted-stories, information, etc.- are also sited in the signifiers of
cultural property. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention's retirement of the 1970
UNESCO Convention requirement that a piece be "old" is also in accordance
with the perspective of this Comment.
While this bias may appear overinclusive, it is helpful to recall that the
morphology of traditional Western property theory reflects very abstract
notions of property. Thus we find Lockean labor concepts, intellectual
property notions regarding the creation of value, prime possessor norms and
utilitarian concepts all competing, among others, for hegemony. Property
eludes categorical or normative definition.
B. Controlling International Regulations on Cultural Property
1. The 1954 Hague Convention
Prior to World War II, recognition of the enormous illicit international
movement in cultural property spawned a few multilateral regulatory
agreements "adopted by almost all source nations and relatively few market
17 The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention's definition of cultural property reflects recent jurisprudential
arguments extolling the need for a more liberal understanding of cultural property. See. id.
18 Stephanie 0. Forbes, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Protect Cultural
Property, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW 235, 238 (1996).
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nations."' 9  Initially, these agreements were exclusively directed toward
curbing the theft of cultural property during acts of belligerence or during
temporary post-war occupations of defeated nations.20
The experiences of WWII and the revelations of the Nuremberg Trial
dramatically illustrated the inadequacy of the existing international codes and
conventions to protect cultural property. Under international laws prior to
1954, punishment for treaty violations was merely a civil fine; not
surprisingly, such flaccid treaty provisions were ignored by belligerents
during World War 11.21 The 1954 Hague Convention22 was designed to "add
teeth" to the earlier incarnations of the Hague Convention by making
violations war crimes, subject to criminal prosecution and punishment.23
Although the 1954 Hague Convention has become an essentially mothball
convention, it was invoked recently during international talks condemning
Iraq's destruction of cultural property in Iran during the Iraq-Iran War.24
2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
The drafters of the 1970 UNESCO Convention sought to remedy the
limited reach of the 1954 Hague Convention. While the 1954 Hague
Convention was notable as a flagship agreement, it was, by its own terms,
limited to regulating illicit cultural property exchanges derived from acts of
belligerence. The 1970 UNESCO Convention remedies this problem by
imposing a regulatory regime over the export and import of cultural property
during peacetime. Unfortunately, at ratification, the 1970 UNESCO
Convention had 47 source nations as signatories and only three market
nations. 25 Twenty-seven years later, the bulk of market nations have still not
signed the Convention.26 Additionally, the Convention embodies the civil law
'9 Id. at 243.
20 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflection on Criminal Jurisdiction in the International Protection of
Cultural Property, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 281, 289 (1983).
21 The most egregious violations were committed by or in collusion with Nazi Germany, which
instrumented the plundering of hundreds of private and public art collections during its hostile invasions
and occupations in the European Theater. See id. at 292.
22 The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
23 See Bassiouni, supra note 20, at 296.
24 David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and its Emergence into
Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349, 371-77 (1993).
25 The three market nations were the United States, Canada and Australia.
26 Key nations that have not yet signed are England, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, and France.
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presumption that a bona fide purchaser obtains legal title even if the piece is
later discovered to have been stolen.
3. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
In the 1980s, UNIDROIT 27 was requested by UNESCO to draft
another multilateral treaty, one that might elicit signatures from the holdout
market nations; the draft created was subsequently adopted in 1995.28 In
1990, UNIDROIT presented to UNESCO the draft UNIDROIT Convention
which was subsequently adopted in 1995. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
abandons the civil law perspective of the 1970 UNESCO Convention that had
given generous protection to "good faith purchasers." In its place, it grafts a
common law approach on to international regulations, mandating repatriation
of all stolen property, irrespective of whether the purchase was made in
"good faith" or not.
C. Controlling National Regulations on Cultural Property
Source nations now protect their cultural resources through an
expanding web of domestic national laws.29  There are two key types of
domestic laws designed to protect cultural property: laws to govern the
illegal export of cultural property and laws to nationalize any significant
cultural property still remaining within a country's borders. Source nations
have expanded promulgation of such regulations as their leaders increasingly
realize that, absent domestic controls, even the most comprehensive
international conventions are ineffective in stemming the illicit trade in
antiquities. In addition to these controls, art-rich nations must also attempt to
27 UNIDROIT, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, is a consortium of 50
nations chartered with consolidating the private civil laws of separate nations into unified international
codes.
28 See Borodkin, supra note 16.
29 Contemporary national laws often function both as prophylactic measures to prevent illegal
exportation as well as preservation measures to ensure restoration. See Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for
Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1033, 1034 (1993). For example, Indonesia has amended its national constitution to
include an article on cultural resource management. Lee Siew Hua, Saving Asia's Ancient Monuments,
SINGAPORE STRAIT TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at 1. The most up to date resource on national regulations of
cultural property is Bonnie Burnham's compilation survey, which is more a manual than a synthetic
study: THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION (International
Council of Museums: Paris, 1974).
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control the formidable kleptocracy of peculators, art smugglers and traffickers
within their own borders.
30
Since 1989, the number of nations with domestic export laws
governing the movement of cultural property through outright export
prohibitions or licensing provisions rose to 141 .31  While protection of
cultural property "successes are relatively few in a continent as rich in
monuments as Asia ... the number is on the rise.",32 Even very poor Asian
nations-such as Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia-have "made the
preservation of selected monuments a high priority. 33
Another protection method source nations are using is national and
international art registries. These registries mandate the registration and
recording of important cultural property in their databases 3 4 Art thieves are
reluctant to steal items that nations subsequently may be able to list in
international registries or catalogues of missing art objects. 35 Art-possessing
nations have been instituting on-site management and monitoring of artifact-
rich locations, 36 not just in museums but at other sites where thefts are likely
to occur.37 For example, the 50,000 ciffside stone sculptures at Dazu in
30 Combating the domestic black market is a frustrating mission, inasmuch as some state officials
charged with protecting cultural property are often themselves part of the illegal network. See Borodkin,
supra note 17, at 393; Mary Battiata, Eastern Europe 's Art Heritage is Ravaged by Thieves; Western
Collectors Said to Buy Stolen Items, WASH. POST., Feb. 27, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2202790; John
Carvel, Pillagers with an Eye for Profit Strip the Former Soviet Bloc of its Artistic Heritage as "Cultural
Cleansing" Sweeps over Central and Eastern Europe, THE GuARDiAN, Nov. 20, 1993, at 22, available in
1993 WL 4160370; Eddie Koch, Greece: Deputy Police ChiefArrested in Art Theft Scandal, Int'l Press
Service, Nov. 4, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2534185. In Thailand, for example, a major smuggling ring
in Chiang Mai is run by a former government minister; because of his entrenched political influence,
police are powerless to halt his activities. See Teffi, supra note 1.
31 L. PRoTT & P. O'KEEFE, NATIONAL LEGAL CONTROL OF ILuicrr TRAFFiC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY
2 at 484 (1983).
32 Lee Siew Hua, supra note 29.
33 id.
34 Greater on-site security and "an inventory, preferably on an electronic database and online to
Interpl... will be the best supporting safeguards." Ooi Kok Chuen, More Stringent Security is Needed
in Region's Art Troves, NEW STRArrs TiES, Apr. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2956909.
Computerized cataloguing is gaining increasing reliance. See Homecoming for Long-Lost Buddha Statue,
SINGAPORE STRAIT TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, available in 1997 WL 14668801.
35 In addition to domestic registries, both the International Art Loss Register and Lasernet Theft
Line maintain computer databases of missing artworks. Id. See also, Kandell, supra note 9. The
International Foundation for Art Research and the Stolen Art Registry are also helpful sources.
36 Art traffickers steal both from sites where the artifacts are still in situ and also from museums. In
1992, Peru's National Museum of Archeology, Anthropology and History was hit twice by art thieves,
with significant losses each time. Nathaniel C. Nash, Erasing the Past: Looters Plunder Archeological
Ruins, Leaving Little Cultural Heritage Behind, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1993, available in 1993 WL
9618112.
31 See Kandell, supra note 9.
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China now have continuous protection by both local volunteers and police
patrols.38 Asian countries are also devoting more of their scarce national
resources to education in cultural property as "[s]pecialized training is ...
being pushed now in a host of countries, from Malaysia to Myanmar.
'
,
39
Some nations have received international funds for these endeavors but
response has been slow. For example, UNESCO has tried to deploy round-
the-clock guards at Angkor Wat in Cambodia (an already mutilated site
rapidly being depleted of its irreplaceable masterpieces) but donations have
only trickled in.a0
D. Museum and Auction House Rules on Acquisition
1. Museums
Since nearly one-quarter of the world's museums are in America, 41 this
Comment will present remarks about U.S. museum rules in order to provide a
general background on in-house museum acquisition policies. Prior to 1970,
the U.S. was infamous for turning a blind eye to the importation of cultural
property and, not surprisingly, had the corollary reputation as the largest
buyers' market for illicitly-obtained cultural property.42  Consequently, a
significant percentage of stolen cultural property is on display in America's
museums.
4 3
After 1970, U.S. museums began to adopt greater self-control in
collection expansion.44 For example, museums have recently become more
cautious in collecting artifacts from Southeast Asia-due in part to the
"embarrassment to the museum and the donor" in recent well-publicized
repatriation cases.4 5  The now-formalized acquisition policies generally
require legal title, proof that the 1970 UNESCO Convention's export
38 Lee Siew Hua, supra note 29, at 5.
39 id.
40 See Telt, supra note 1.
41 JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETuRN OF CULTURAL TREAsuRtEs 157 (1996).
42 In reference to the Metropolitan Museum of Art's art acquisition policies in the 1960s, its then-
Director, Thomas Hoving stated: "you did not ask anybody where [antiquities] came from. If you like
(sic) them, you bought them." Collectors or Looters?, THE ECONOMIST Oct. 17, 1987, at 117, 117-18.43 id.
SId.
45 Tefft, supra note 1. See also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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program has been complied with, and information on provenance.4 6 Although
the 1970 UNESCO and 1995 UNIDROIT Convention mandates are binding
in America only on federally-funded museums 47 (which constitute only a
small percentage of U.S. museums), 48 there is pressure from pan-museum
organizations such as the Council of the Archeological Institute of America,
Council of the American Association of Museums, and the International
Council of Museums4 9 on private institutions to practice self-restraint in their
accessioning policies. Moreover, museums have adopted more formal
policies for the deaccessioning of pieces from their permanent collections.
Again, this trend began in the post-1970 UNESCO Convention climate,
resulting in "[ijndividual museums voluntarily return[ing] illegally exported
and stolen works to their countries of origin."5°
However, despite the formalized recording of policies, the actual
implementation of the policy provisions by a museum may fall short of its
lofty avowed goals. For example, the AIC has adopted post-1970 UNESCO
"Acquisitions Guidelines" which contain admirable language mandating the
museum not violate any country of origin's laws, assure valid title prior to
acquisition and willingly return objects illegally-exported. However, as the
Thai lintel case demonstrates, the AIC has not always followed these
exhortations. The AIC Guidlines also carry a repatriation proviso that objects
are to be returned "given adequate monetary reimbursement." For less
wealthy countries seeking repatriation, it is very difficult to meet the AIC's
requirement that the country of origin, in essence, purchase back, at current
hammer price, 51 its stolen cultural property.
2. Auction Houses
Auction houses impart what may be the most odious legacy of art
collection. 52 Unlike museums which have at least the stated goal of making
46 GREENFIELD, supra note 41, at 157. "Provenance" of a piece refers to the documented origin or
history of a piece; it is a term of art from the art dealing world and is not co-extensive with the term "legal
title."
47 Such as the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the National Museum of Art and the
Smithsonian.
48 GREENFIELD, supra note 41, at 157.
49 The AIA, CAAM, and ICOM, respectively.
so GREENFIELD, supra note 41, at 157.
S The term "hammer price" refers to the price that an object would currently bring if sold by an art
auction house.
52 Their legacy is an old one as well. Recently, Scottish curators, discussing Scotland's
exceptionally fine Asian art collection:
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art accessible to the public, art houses function to remanage or
reconceptualize art into a form of speculative investment; art is transmogrified
through a "commercial or privatization phase, in which the historical or
aesthetic values of art works are transformed by financial speculation.,
53
Auction houses and collectors often repeat the worn and ultimately
indefensible bromide that they are merely "caretakers" or "stewards"
displaying artworks that would be poorly preserved in their nations of origin.
In fact, stolen art work in private collections essentially "disappears for
good"54 from both the public and the producing culture once it leaves the
auction room floor. More worrisome is that the survivability of art owned by
private individuals is subject to the whims of the owner. 5
Moreover, the two best-known auction houses, Christies and Sotheby's
do not simply shadow trends, they artificially create markets: "The Sotheby's
approach is not to wait for trends but to develop them aggressively,
stimulating new fields of interest .... -56 The auction houses have recently
been turning to Asian art as the newest "trend ' 57 with "a considerable number
of major works of art said to have come out of China."58 Such artificially-
created trends spur consumer demand which, in turn, feeds the growth of the
black market.5 9
The most deleterious effect art auction houses have on the integrity of
cultural property is the houses' historical disregard for regulatory
frameworks, national or international. Art auction houses are bound by the
acknowledge[d] that the volume and strength of the East Asian art in the National Museum of
Scotland owe in part to the efforts of the French and British troops that sacked the Summer
Palace in Beijing in 1860, and the consequent flooding of auction houses in Paris and London
with imperial treasures.
Pilfered Gifts from Asia, THE DAILY YOMnIUI, Jan. 19, 1997 (reviewing Jane Wilkerson & Nick Pearce,
Harmony & Contrast (1996)).
53 Carl Nagin, The Politics of Plunder, THE NEW ART EXAMINER, Nov. 1986, at 22, 26. Some
critics recognize a similar alchemical function for museums. The writer Andre Malraux, whose own
hands were sullied by questionable art acquisitions, was quite critical of the artificial ethos of museums,
often crediting them as bastions of historical revisionism. See ANDRE MALRAUX, LA MUSEE IMAGINAIRE
DE LA ScuLPTuRE MONDIALE (Paris, Gallimard, 1952-54).
54 Gary Schwartz, Ars Moriendi: The Mortality ofArt, ART IN AMERICA, Nov. 1996, at 28.
5 Id. The late Ryoei Saito, former owner of Daishowa Paper Company, purchased a rare Van Gogh
painting and a Renoir painting in 1990. Thereafter, Saito announced his intentions to destroy the
paintings by burning them on his funeral pyre, following the traditional Japanese custom of incinerating
objects dear to the deceased with the body. Id.
56 See Meyer, supra note 24, at 379. "Among the auction houses, Christies was the first to bring in
Indonesian paintings, about 2 1/2 years ago." Leong Weng Kam, supra note 11.
57 Hammering Asia, supra note 12.
58 GREENFIELD, supra note 41, at 214.
5, See Carvel, supra note 30; Ooi Kok Chuen, supra note 34.
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law of agency which permits auction houses to shirk any fiduciary obligations
to the producing nation or the general public, incurring obligation only to the
auction house's individual consignors. 60 One critique indicted auction houses
with promoting "cultural property as a lucrative field for dishonest activities"
by conducting their business with complete "exclusion of responsibility for...
provenance." 6 1
III. THE IDEOLOGIES UNDERGIRDING CULTURAL PROPERTY CLAIMS
A. Cultural Internationalism
National and international regulations reflect two essential modes for
analyzing international law and the attendant duties and rights pertaining to
cultural property. The international codes and conventions of the early 20th
century together reflect a credo for cultural property called, variously,
"cultural internationalism", "supranationalism", "meta-nationalism", or
"cosmopolitanism. '62  Under this analysis, cultural property and its legacy
supersede the "arbitrary" boundaries of the producing nation and is celebrated
as the cultural manifestation of a synoptic universalism, the product of the
(fictionalized) artist-as-human simpliciter.
This ideology is best represented by the argument that the Elgin
Marbles are now "the cultural heritage of all mankind',63 and are as well-
housed-some would argue, better-housed-in the British Museum as they
would be in Athens. Indeed, the millions that wealthy nations assign to their
museums dwarf the funds allocated for cultural property in poorer nations-
60 Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 381, 384 (1957). See also, ROBERT A. WEINER, THE LAW
AND BUSINESS OF ART 598 (1990). There is some indication that auction houses may be acting with
greater social responsibility, despite the high financial gains. In 1996, "[tlhe strong demand for Southeast
Asian paintings became embarrassingly apparent... when Christies withdrew five Indonesian paintings
after the National Museum in Jakarta saw them and recognized them as stolen." Richardson, supra note
11; see also Leong Weng Kam, supra note 11. "I think it is our duty to report if we know something...
[but w]e don't go out and look for lost paintings" (emphasis added), Ooi Kok Chuen quoting Christies'
Singapore manager, supra note 34.
6' Lyndel V. Prott, International Control of Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage: The 1970.
UNESCO Convention and Some Possible Alternatives, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 333, 345, 349
(1983).
62 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 A.JI.L. 831, 842.
(1986).
63 Cultural internationalism's catch-phrase is derivative from the Preamble to the 1954 Hague
Convention. See The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 22. The phrase is parroted by the British Museum in frequent statements
legitimating its continuing possession of the Elgin Marbles.
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for example, in 1988, Nigeria's annual national budget earmarked only U.S.
$550 for protecting its cultural property.64 Cultural internationalism, an
expression of neo-libertarian rationalism, is generally espoused by museums
or collectors located in market nations.65 The utility of this ideology toward
the acquisitive goals of individual and institutional collectors is patent.
While cultural internationalism's tenets contain some idealistic appeal,
the stark reality is that these so-called custodians for "mankind's heritage"
translate unilaterally into "the wealthy nations and their citizenry. 66  This
patronage "intensif~ies] existing class and national differences in wealth and
sophistication, distort[s] historical relationships, [and] fetishize[s] art
objects.",67  This is achieved by wealthy collectors employing both value
hierarchies based on spatial metaphors of preference and oppositional and
exclusive disjunctions represented by value dualisms. Additionally, there is
the self-deceptive and discretionary myth of "connoisureship", touted as a
near-metaphysical gift, rivaling Divine Inspiration in its mystery, born from
"immediate deliverances of experience, not deliberated reflections upon it.
Hyperborean determination must also be made as to which artworks of the
alien culture are deemed worthy of preservation by "mankind's collectors"
and this implicates a host of oppressive maneuvers as wealthy collectors
poach off other cultures: "Art historians and other professionals have shown
themselves . . . to be perfectly capable of indulging in . . . iconoclasm,
vandalism, political suppression, the targeting of enemy treasures, cultural
genocide, illicit excavation, the removal of art works from public control,
6 Schwartz, supra note 54. For a discussion on ways "ancient monuments in Asia can be saved
without eating into the resources needed for present-day priorities like food and housing for the teeming
millions in the region", see Lee Siew Hua, supra note 29.
65 The tenor of attempts to legitimate, via this doctrine, the continuing possession of illegally-
obtained art is predictably emotive: "[Tihe spirit of magnificence that binds these works shreds in the final
wash any sense of nationhood or proprietorship; just as the stolen object is transformed into a gift priceless
beyond knowing, so it suggests that it really never had any owner-that the most the hands that hold it
can hope for is interim custodianship." Pilfered Gifts from Asia, supra note 52. While this rhetoric
waxes a great deal about the "ownershipless" status of these pieces, the present owner-be it museum,
auction house or collector--can, "in the final wash", become very possessive when suggestion is made for
the art to be transferred to an alternate "interim custodian."
66 Id. The resulting one-way cultural "dialogue" is unquestionably tilted toward the educational
benefit of Western and wealthy nations. "The stolen objects became a gift, for they stimulated in many
Westerners the desire to understand Chinese culture and aesthetics more deeply." Id. On who the lucky
recipients and who the unlucky bestowers of these kinds of "gifts" are, see SALLY PRICE, PRIMrrIVE ART IN
CIVILIZED PLACES, (The University of Chicago Press 1991), especially Chapter 2.
67 Schwartz, supra note 54.
6' CLIFFoRDGEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EsSAYS IN INTERPRETATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 75
(Basic Books 1983); see also Price, supra note 67.
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deliberate neglect, and the application of artistic euthanasia to inconvenient
possessions."
6 9
There are a horizon of legal doctrines invoked by cultural
internationalists to justify the transfer of ownership from the source nation to
the current or aspiring owner: possession, abandonment (res derelictae),
conquest, adverse possession, laches, repose, a lack of clear ownership (res
nullius), statutes of repose and limitation, and bona fide purchase. Protest
over repatriation claims have also been couched in terms of wrongful
"takings" of private property.
70
B. Cultural Nationalism
The alternative mode of thought underlying cultural property
regulations which arose after 197071 is echoed most often by artifact-rich
source nations/peoples.72 Recognition of the need to protect and preserve
cultural property in situ has become more acute as developing nations assert
their rights regarding their historical legacies. This ideology is often termed
"cultural nationalism", "national cultural patrimony" or "romantic
Byronism. 73 This school of thought advocates the necessity of preserving
cultural property in the producing culture and, by extension, repatriating
removed property back to that source culture.
Post-1970 international and national statutes often acknowledge the
legitimacy of cultural nationalism by allowing and encouraging preservation
and repatriation schemes. Unfortunately, this perspective is supported by
rather indeterminate, human rights-based appeals to notions of post-colonial
self-determination and the retention of cultural diversity rather than to
conventional legal justifications. Cultural nationalism can serve as an
emblematic metaphor for these nations; behind the fig leaf of repatriation
claims and export controls often lie plenary assertions about national
autonomy and sovereignty.
69 Schwartz, supra note 54.
'o Stephanie D. Edelson, Note, Concerted International Effort in the Trade of Cultural Property, 16
L. & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1249, 1250 (1984).
71 The 1970 UNESCO Convention is emblematic of this ideology. See notes 25-26 and
accompanying text.
72 See Richardson, supra note 11.
73 For the purposes of this Comment, "cultural patrimony" is the preferred term. For the meaning
and use of the other terms, see John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1880, 1903-05 (1985). Cultural patrimony connotes that cultural property is so inalienably tied to
the legacy of a certain group of people, that it is their unseverable birthright to possess it.
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While source nations prefer to frame their arguments as moral
imperatives, they most often, when forced to cabin their claims into more
conventional legal arguments, pursue repatriation claims through civil actions
in replevin. 74 However, both the U.S. and the U.K. adhere to the common
law notion neo dat quod non habet (one cannot give better title than that
which one has) which, in actions for replevin, defeats the concept of an
"innocent purchaser." 75 While these national legal traditions would seem to
favor the party seeking repatriation, the actual net effect is asymmetry and
disharmony of laws on an international scale: "[b]ecause works of art are
governed by conflicting commercial laws, the results reached in transnational
litigation regarding stolen cultural property widely vary and are often
unpredictable." 76 Moreover, for many poor nations the legal costs of battling
the fantastically wealthy art auction houses, dealers and museums over
ownership rights are prohibitive in themselves, 77 resulting in transactional
costs that consume scarce national financial resources.78
IV. ECONOMIC FORCES AND THE ILLICIT MOVEMENT OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY
Lawrence Tribe has proposed that judicial disputes are not delimited to
the facts and consequences of individual cases but, rather, are part of a larger
narrative voice about social superstructures. Tribe cautions that law is
constitutive in nature and must be carefully monitored to prevent an
automaton subservience to rules that serve only the privileged.79 Property
14 "Once a stolen piece of art is located ... the true owner's principle means of obtaining
possession is through a civil action in replevin." Karen Theresa Burke, International Transfers of Stolen
Cultural Property: Should Thieves Continue to Benefit from Domestic Laws Favoring Bona Fide
Purchasers?, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 427, 429 (1990), citing Comment, The Recovery of Stolen
Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitation, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1122, 1124-1125 (1980). See
also, Collin, supra note 9, at 21-27.
75 See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F.Supp.
1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affid Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Arts, 917
F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
76 Burke, supra note 74, at 450.
7' In 1996, Thailand had to borrow the U.S. $280,000 "necessary" to "compensate" an American
millionaire in possession of a stolen Thai Buddhist antiquity statue. "[Hllundreds of Thais turned up at
Bangkok's Don Muang airport late [at] ... night to welcome home the statue, [stolen from a Sukhothai
temple in 1977.]" Homecoming for Long-Lost Buddha Statute, supra note 34.
78 "The transaction costs of antiquities suits are particularly wasteful when weighed against the
paucity of resources available to protect antiquity in their countries of origin." Borodkin, supra note 17, at
399.
79 Lawrence Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 592, 593 (1985).
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law in particular is a ready handmaiden to such reification. Carol M. Rose
has noted this: "in defining the acts of possession that make up a claim to
property, the law not only rewards the author of the 'text'; it also puts an
imprimatur on a particular symbolic system and the audience that uses this
system. Audiences that do not understand or accept the symbols are out of
luck., 80  In the law surrounding the trade in cultural property, an enamel of
symbolic ideation laminates over and semi-obscures the divisions of privilege
involved, divisions riven by economic disparity and financial legerdemain.
A tremendous amount of money is at play in the illegal movement of
cultural property. 8' The lucrative black market in cultural property has not
only survived the host of national and international regulations designed to
choke it off, it is thriving under them both in Southeast Asia 82 and globally.
83
It has been noted that "almost every antiquity that has arrived in America in
the past ten to twenty years has broken the law of the country from which it
came." 84 As regards profitability, the only rivals to the illicit cultural property
market in terms of the volume of illegal revenue generated are the
international narcotics market and the traffic in illegal arms sales.85 Despite
the comparable pecuniary benefits, the silk-collar criminals engaged in art
trafficking face far less harsh penalties for art trafficking than they might from
illegal arms or drug sales. 86 The combination of high profit87 with low risks
has proved an ideal crucible for fomenting very sophisticated smuggling
networks which, in some nations, take the form of professional syndicates. 88
80 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 85 (1985).
81 Leong Weng Kam, supra note 11.
82 Tefft, supra note 1.
83 See Forbes, supra note 18, at 236. See also Margules, supra note 9; Collin, supra note 9, at 18.
84 Ricardo Elia, Ricardo Elia Responds, ARCHEOLOGY, May/June 1993 at 1, 17.
85 Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does the Unidroit
Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 469, 472-73 (1994).
86 In 1987, an American smuggling U.S. $288,000 worth of pre-Columbian artifacts was fined a
mere U.S. $1000 and his sentence was suspended to 200 hours of community service. Collectors or
Looters?, supra note 42.
87 The profit jump can be enormous, with an original finder usually garnering about 1% of the total
amount realized through final sale: In 1989, a farmer in Turkey sold a Hellenistic marble frieze he had
uncovered to an art trafficker for U.S. $7,000. While this may have been a windfall for the farmer, the
piece was later put up for sale on the illicit art market for U.S. $850,000. Charles V. Bagli, Hot Frieze,
Missing Since 1989, Found in Madison's Fortuna Gallery, N.Y. OBSERVER, Aug. 16 & 23, 1993, at 1, 22.
Likewise, a New Mexico Mimbes pot that may be initially sold to a dealer for U.S. $200-$1000, could be
resold in Europe for as much as U.S. $400,000. John Neary, Project Sting, ARCHEOLOGY, Sept./Oct.
1993, at 52, 52-54.
88 Thomas Hoving, Turkish Delight, ART & AUcnON June 1993, at 88. See also Koch, supra note 30.
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Networks in the "enlightened and wealthy West"89 are by far the most active
agents:9° "[i]n almost all of Western Europe, it is not an offence to import a
work of art that has been illegally exported from another country." 91
Transmission patterns follow predictable paths because the unilateral
movement of cultural property is routine. That movement can be analyzed
using traditional capitalist modes for the trade flow of illegal goods: nations
are parsed into source nations, transit or "laundering" nations,92 and market
nations.9 3 Applying this analysis to the cultural property black market, source
nations are said to be "rich in cultural artifacts beyond any conceivable local
use" 94 while market nations are poor in such resources. Consequently, the
theory goes, the capitalist free market system encourages open and
unrestricted exchanges between the supply and demand sides of this dyad.
For some legal scholars, augmented value is the only privileged consideration
in the competing ownership of scarce resources.95
However, as a leading cultural property scholar noted, "Despite their
enthusiasm for other kinds of export trade, most source nations vigorously
oppose the export of cultural objects, 96 concluding that this schismatic
position must be due to those nations' "lack of cultural expertise and
organization to deal with cultural property as a resource, like other resources,
to be managed and exploited., 97  This explanation-that source countries
have parochial notions of property and require tutelage in the "exploitation"
of their culture as a market resource-is shockingly paternalistic; it is a
89 Schwartz, supra note 54.
90 Japan, which has transformed into an art-collecting nation, is an exception to this EastfWest
binary.
9' Carvel, supra note 30.
92 "Laundering" nations are usually civil law nations in Western Europe; Switzerland being the
most infamous art laundromat. An illegally obtained work of art is hidden in the country for the requisite
amount of time needed to toll its statue of limitations under bona fide purchaser laws. The piece is then
sold with a legal bill of sale with the work subsequently reemerging on the legal art market stage.
Christies and Southeby's accept such bills of sale as transferring good title. The purchaser at the end of
this chain is insulated from exploring the pedigree of a piece: "When not directly involved, consciences
are easily washed and a bank or businessman may find the purchase of an art object (the doubtful origin of
which may have become quite remote in the long series of passages) legitimate.. The purchaser is either
unaware of the original provenance of the art work or he considers the matter to be of sole concern to the
thief, intermediary, or re-seller." Giuliana Luna, The Protection of the Cultural Heritage: An Italian
Perspective, in THE PROTECTION OF THE ARTISTIC AND ARCHEOLOGICAL HERITAGE: A VIEW FROM ITALY
AND INDIA 180-81 (1976).
93 Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 31.
94 Merryman, supra note 62, at 832.
95 Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323, 324 (1978).
96 Merryman, supra note 62, at 842.97 Id. at 833, n.5.
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position, however, touted by almost all the leading market players in the field
of cultural property. Source nations are criticized for not "exploiting" (read
"selling") their cultural resources with greater abandon, echoing Western
positions on source nations' natural resource management. For example, in
1992, when China, in an innovative move, held a government auction of some
of its antiquities, it was criticized by Western dealers for offering less than the
most rare of its cultural property for sale.
98
Despite the reluctance of cultural property scholars to assign workings
of the black market in cultural property to purely economic machinations, 99
the relative wealth of nations animates the entire narrative of cultural property
exchanges. It is duly noted by scholars in the field that, in cultural property
exchanges, usually "the source nation is relatively poor and the market nation
wealthy." 10 0 It is logical and not altogether unfruitful to generalize about the
relations of source and market nations by arraying them along lines of
industrialization, location along the West/East or North/South axes, residual
effects of colonialism, etc. However, these binaries are neither neat nor true.
For example, Asia encompasses nations that are hybrids of source and market
nations: Thailand has become infamous for its recent art plunders upon its
relatively much poorer neighbor, Cambodia. Thai smugglers have "flooded
the black market in the Thai capital of Bangkok with priceless artifacts
plundered from Angor Wat and other architectural jewels in the region. ' ' J 1
Treasures from Angor Wat are also readily available in Hanoi and Saigon
shops, the booty of Vietnamese soldiers who withdrew in 1989 from
Cambodia after 11 years of hostile occupation. And, "Singapore, which as a
free port has no restrictions on the sale of stole art pieces, is luring treasures
from as far away as China and Pakistan."1 °2
An alternative method for analyzing the market flow of cultural
property could use the Marxist entities of "use value" versus "exchange
value. 10 3  This paradigm is premised on the assumption that a system
founded on absolute prohibition is impracticable and a system founded on
absolute laissez-faire economics is unconscionable. Accordingly, it might be
98 Tuyet Nguyet & John Cairns, '92 Beijing International Auction and China Treasures '92
Shanghai, ART OF ASIA, Jan-Feb 1993, 55, 58.
99 In protesting the terms "market nation" and "source nation," one scholar has complained that
"the terms result in 'political branding,' which portray collector nations as colonist-conquerors and source
nations as exploited victims." Borodkin, supra note 17, at 385. However, this result does not seem
untoward to me.
'00 Id. at 385-87.
'0 Tefft, supra note 1.
102 Id.; See also Lee Siew Hua, supra note 29.
103 Karl Marx, Capital, in THE MARx-ENGELS READER 351 (Robert C. Tucker ed. 1978).
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proposed that artifact-rich nations defeat the black market through a co-
optation maneuver: control the commodification of artifacts from their use
value to their exchange value through the erection of a state auction house run
by the artifact-rich nation. This nation can then use the funds raised to fulfill
the "other noncultural needs" of their citizenry."°
While this model has a certain overlay of reasonableness, at the end of
the day, there is not much in the way of meaningful change. Looked at one
way, this proposal aims to give the poorer, underdeveloped nations a
mechanism by which, to assist in feeding their people, they can sell off their
cultural heritage to wealthier, post-scarcity nations. Any leavening altruism in
this model is limited to the notion that the largesse from such antiquity sales
would now go directly to the source nations, thereby eliminating the role of
both the black market and art dealing profiteers. However, this sole
appealing aspect of the plan does not offset the lacerating transactional costs
to the source nation, i.e., the loss of cultural patrimony. In practical terms, it
is untenable to denude impoverished nations of a scarce and non-
replenishable resource that might eventually serve to stimulate their economy
(cultural property resources have provided a lucrative industry in nations
where tourists visit the source nation directly to experience its intact cultural
heritage.) 10 5 As Jeremy Bentham observed, property provides security10 6 and
predictability: "Property is nothing but the basis of expectation. ' '10 7 Property
expectations typically manifest themselves as sacrosanct reifications modeling
Hohfeldian legal relations.'0 8 This guiding principle of property law holds
true for sovereign nations as well as private individuals.
Lastly, outright exploitation of non-renewable resources leads to a
classic tragedy of the commons dilemma: the immediate relief of subsistence
discomfort is purchased at a "high discount rate, ' 9 i.e., with no
consideration of its longitudinal effects on the people the remedy is to serve.
104 Borodkin, supra note 17, at 411.
'o' "Thailand... provides a shining example-tourism is its best income earner." Lee Siew Hua,
supra note 29.
10 Jeremy Bentham, Analysis of the Evils Which Result From Attacks Upon Property, in THE
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 70 (1931).
107 Jeremy Bentham, Security and Equality in Property, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note
106, at 115.
108 Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
'09 Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1993).
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V. CULTURAL PROPERTY MOVEMENT AS TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
For reasons this Comment has adumbrated, it is helpful to view cultural
property as a resource, not unlike a natural resource. The current cultural
property market, fettered by international and national regulations, is a
modem construct resulting from an environment in which resources are
increasingly scarce. As one art historian aptly described it: "We are
depleting our cultural resources as unrelentingly as our natural resources.""l 0
"Cultural internationalism" presupposes cultural property to dwell in an
ownerless commons,' allowing for a wide latitude of laxness in culling
objects out of that commons. Increasing transaction costs in art collecting
arise from the ignored deleterious externalities that unbridled thefts cause.
Cultural property, in almost all instances, is a non-renewable, non-
replenishable resource.
Like natural resources, cultural property also is suffering "large-scale
depletion"; individual consumption of the resource (that is, art collecting) is
no longer a solitary event but, rather, a synthetic activity with concrete impact
upon the competing right of communities also to access a rare resource. Until
relatively recently, it may have been argued with integrity that cultural
property resources dwelt in an "ownerless" state, belonging to "the human
heritage." However, as antiquities have become more scarce, the need to
resolve ownership claims has also become more pivotal. Selecting
responsible entities to be approved caretakers for these resources is a crucial
aspect of cultural property jurisprudence.
Traditional Lockean notions of property ownership provide criterion to
determine at what point property, formerly part of the commons, becomes
vested with a private right of ownership. 112 Locke's purpose was to assist in
securing private ownership claims that would withstand competing public
ownership claims by the government for the same resource. Under Lockean
analysis, competing rights are to be weighed according to the use the claimant
makes of the disputed, hithertofore common, property. Ownership rights are
to be bestowed on the claimant making the most aggressive use of the
property resource.1 3
Unfortunately, classic Lockean property analysis does not graft well
onto cultural property resource problems because determining "use rights" is
110 Schwartz, supra note 54.
1 See generally Hardin, supra note 14.
12 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15-16 (Tuttle 1990).
13 Id. at 22-24.
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difficult. Cultural nationalists may make a legitimate Lockean claim that their
"use" of the object within the cultural tradition that created it is sufficient to
vest the superior property right with them. Cultural internationalists on the
other hand might argue that their "use"-i.e., their superior collecting,
preserving and displaying skills-demonstrate a greater "'use" of cultural
property, endowing them with a greater claim of ownership based on
utilitarian principles of property. This analysis fails ultimately because it is
more than an objective binary, it is a value dualism implicating an adversarial
ranking, a hierarchical model, in which one use/claim is superordinate and the
other use/claim subordinate. Given the significant polyvalence among factors
at play with competing rights and claims, no such weighting is legitimately
possible.
Because the competing concerns of cultural property use replicates that
of scarce natural resources, it makes greater sense to extend the Lockean
model of community rights versus private rights to the current arena of
environmental resource law. Contemporary property rights can employ
Lockean property consumption theory for the purpose of regulating
environmental resource use under two criterion: exclusive consumption
benefits and nonexclusive consumption benefits." 4 Exclusive consumption
benefits are received only by the private owner of the property-the general
community receives virtually no benefit from the property and so has little
rationale for dictating its use." 5  Nonexclusive consumption benefits,
however, are those that flow not only to the private property owner but also
to the larger community." 6 As nonexclusive consumption benefits begin to
outpace the exclusive consumption benefits, the arguments for exclusive
private control of that property begin to fragment. 117
At this point the hithertofore inconclusive legal strata become more
sharply defined and either side-the exclusive consumptive benefactor or
the nonexclusive consumptive benefactor-may acquiesce use of the
disputed resource if the external or transactional costs (such as those
involved either in litigation over or policing of the resource)" 8 become too
114 Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REv. 481, 485
(1993).
115 Id.
116 Id. In fact, Sax uses as his example of a nonexclusive consumption benefit a type of cultural
property: a historic building owned privately but which benefits the community in terms of architecture,
history and culture. Id.
.. Id. at 486.
1S Stephen Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13
J.L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970).
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high. Carol Rose has observed that, in property disputes, the transactional
costs may be so high that one side may rapidly fold to the demands of the
other because the "conflict costs begin to outweigh the costs of taking [the
resource] out of the commons and establishing clear property
entitlements."'1 9 However, for some exclusive consumption benefactors,
the game is worth the candle: "What makes it worth it? Increasing
scarcity of the resource..." 120 and its corollary rise in value.
When this impasse is reached-when a resource is so scarce that it
possesses enough valuation to be the object of use claims under both the
public domain and under private consumption-then use of the resource and
its commodification may become prey to a tragedy of the commons scenario.
This scenario illustrates the problem of allocating scarce resources among
multiple claimants/users and is derived from Garrett Hardin's classic essay
"The Tragedy of the Commons.", 121  Hardin demonstrated how self-
maximizing, rationally-acting individual users tapping into a limited resource-
support system will, over time, cause non-replenishable loss to that system
and to the collective good, irrespective of how well-meaning each individual
user's intentions are. 122  Moreover, the total payoffs in equilibrium are
unstable, constantly shifting in flux relative to definitions of social and
personal optimality as well as pressures to engage in consensual bargaining.
The competing interests and choices in Hardin's tragedy of the
commons analysis mirror the well-known game theory puzzle called
prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma formula has often been applied
to environmental resource depletion situations because it perfectly
encapsulates the benefits and detriments of cooperative maneuvers versus
self-maximizing maneuvers. When all the players in a prisoner's dilemma act
in their own interest, there emerges a classic tragedy of the commons conflict.
One of the solutions Hardin promoted to solve the prisoner's dilemma
tension over private/public use of scarce environmental resources was either
privatizing the resource (for example, privatizing the national and state park
systems) and/or allocating the right to use the resource (visiting the park)
based on such variables as wealth123 or an auction system. This is not unlike
the state cultural property auction system posited in the previous section
"9 Carol M. Rose, Crystals andMud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 578 (1988).
120 id.
121 Hardin, supra note 14.
122 JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 187 (1989).
123 Hardin in this instance is not too far afield from the classic Lockean prediction that money and
markets would act as mechanisms against the over-consumption of public resources. Compare RODGERS,
supra, note 14, at 40-41 (discussing Hardin) with LOCKE, supra note 112, at 20.
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above. Hardin also considered the option of aggregating all parts of a certain
scarce resource into one unified property whole, owned and regulated by a
central government with the plenary power to force its user-citizens into self-
restrained modes of individual or collective use.
124
Another of Hardin's answers to the puzzle of how to preserve sparse
resources was to adopt methods of "mutual coercion mutually agreed
upon" 12 5-very rigidified systems of regulated behavior. This type of
solution is nothing novel, having been urged as axiomatic by law theorists
from Blackstone 126 to, Posner: 127 the law responds to decreasing availability
of a resource by an attendant increasing ossification of the property rights
appurtenant to that resource. 128  This approach is also said to promote free
market exchange. Clifford Holdemess, in writing about optimal means for
advancing the efficient allocation of goods, has also promoted exacting,
comprehensive entitlements over non-exclusive, inexact entitlements. 129
Holderness argues that such precise entitlements decreases the incidence of
external transaction and information costs. 130
Indeed, the current nexus of ever-tightening international and national
regulations on the transmission of cultural property mimics this so-called
inevitable outcome. However, "the trouble with this 'scarcity story' is that
things don't seem to work this way, or at least not all the time.' 131 For
cultural property, these "things don't seem to work" because the paramount
problem with the present coercive regulatory regime is that it has the
unintended consequence of promoting the black market: "As in the narcotic
context, stronger enforcement efforts do not necessarily yield better results,
and can even lead to perverse side effects.' 32
124 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 8-9 (1990).
125 RODGERS, supra note 14 at 40 (quoting Hardin).
126 W. BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 4 (University of Chicago Press
1979) (property rights in land established as agricultural use of land grew).
127 RICHARD POSNER, ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 30 (3d ed. 1986).
12' As Carol M. Rose has stated:
Economic thinkers have been telling us for at least two centuries that the more important a
given kind of thing becomes for us, the more likely we are to have these hard-edged rules to
manage it. We draw ever sharper lines around our entitlements so that we know who has what,
and so that we can trade instead of getting into the confusion and disputes that would only
escalate as the goods in question become scarcer and more highly valued.
Rose, supra note 119, at 577.
129 Clifford Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 322 (1985).
13 Id. at 322-26.
131 Rose, supra note 119, at 577.
132 See Borodkin, supra note 17, at 405.
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The transmission of cultural property is permeated with implicit market
mechanisms and aggregated economic incentives that promote illicit trade in
stolen goods. These stimulants include the regulations: "Under present
conditions, conflicting import and export regulations in the international legal
framework act to permit laundering of smuggled artifacts.' '133  Other
contributors include the art auction houses and dealers: "[T]he idiosyncratic
fine arts trade. . provides ideal conditions for a black market in
antiquities."' 34 Additional stimulation is in the mechanisms of purchasing
transactions:
[L]aws . . assume that buyers are in an efficient position to
investigate whether an item is stolen. This assumption fails to
recognize the collective action problem inherent in the
antiquities context: the complexity of the art market would make
it extremely inefficient to require individual purchasers in each
transaction to investigate [the pedigree of each piece]. 135
The aggregate economic incentives, increasing scarcity of antiquities,
conflicting regulations and high transactional costs for remedies combine
together to produce the current conditions. These conditions aggravate
depletion as the black market and tightening regulations feed off one another
in a vicious circle. As one author characterized it: "[As] the demand for
antiquities grows, the supply is cut off. As the value of the goods increases,
so does the incidence of their illegal excavation, exportation and sale on the
international black market .... [More intense regulation drives the growth
of clandestine excavations and the black markets."' 13 6 Ironically, it is
precisely the "strict laws" in combination with the "market for classical
antiquities" that have "instigated an entire network of organized
smugglers."'
137
133 Id. at 405-06.
134 Id. at 405.
135 Id. at 407.
136 Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends in the Flourishing International Trade of Art and
Antiquities: Restitutio in Integrum and Possessio Animo Ferundi/Lucrandi, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 31, 32
(1995).
137 Margules, supra note 9, at 609.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A COOPERATIVE NORM-BASED SOLUTION
Some scholars in group dynamics theory do not see a solution to
classic tragedy-of-the commons dilemmas because they see individual actors
always maneuvering toward self-serving ends. 138 Fortunately, some scholars
have noted the success of group cooperative schemes in which cooperation
and compliance work together to allow for both consumption and
preservation of limited resources. These complex systems are usually
"culturally derived, held in place by a network of customs, conventions, and
commitments and involve 'rich mixtures' of public and private
instrumentalities.' 3 9
Solutions of strong centripetal regulatory regimes and private
commodification of scarce resources are not present in these working models:
"The two solutions urged in the simple models-complete government
control and untrammeled privatization-are prominent only in the minds of
the analysts."' 40 When facing a threat to a coveted resource, there are two
neo-Malthusian corridors we can search in for remedy: natural restrictions or
moral restraint. The latter choice must be the ground for assessing solutions
to the rapid displacement of cultural property.
What works best long-term are norm-driven cooperative solutions that
operate along both informal and quasi-formal methods of inducement. These
models employ a strategy of ethical imperatives and exhortations. In the field
of scarce environmental resources, this strategy "appeals to the goodwill and
sense of common duty of the citizenry; exhortative control strategies ask the
citizen to refrain from overuse of [scarce natural resources.y' 141 While these
models seem flaccid to adherents of Oliver Wendell Holmes' "bad man"
juridical theory-skeptics who believe that law "works" in norming
pathological behavior primarily though draconian threats of punitive
consequences-there is growing awareness that communitarian exhortations
toward ethical conformity are equally potent. A split between the norms of
moral responsibility theory reflect this binary. The consequentialist point of
view of Holmes is mirrored in the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John
138 "[U]nless there is coercion or some other device to make individuals act in their common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve the common or group interest." M.
OLSON, THE LoGIc OF COLLECTIVE AcTIoN: PuBLIc GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965).
139 See RODGERS, supra note 14, at 41-42. See also R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984).
140 RODGERS, supra note 14, at 42.
141 Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DuKEL.J. 1, 30 (1991).
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Stuart Mill. Under utilitarianism, an act's moral obligations are to be
adjudged solely by the outcome resulting from performing the act. That is,
one must evaluate whether the performance of an act or the obeyance of a
rule result in a higher net balance of right/pleasure over wrong/pain than
would the alternate performance of a competing act or rule. In contrast, on
the other side of the binary lies deontological ethics, as advanced by Aristotle
and Immanuel Kant. Under deontological analysis, the benchmark for
assessing the correctness or preferability of competing possible conducts is
not in regards to the conduct's consequences but, rather, to objective,
normative ethical criteria; the consequences are irrelevant. Most recently, the
consequentialist point of view has been eroded by integrative solutions
predicated upon deontological ethics.
Educative measures based on deontological ethics are necessary to
transform the current acquisitive and commodifying taxonomy of cultural
property into not only a socially unacceptable exercise but an irrational one as
well. The root of the ethos surrounding the transfer of cultural property lies in
a priori assumptions about property and its alienability. Inalienability is used
elastically to refer to rights and entitlements which are non-fungible, which
cannot be sold, transferred or marketed. The a priori assumptive nexus that
links use of the term "alienability" to the term "right" is that the interests
associated with the right cannot be removed or separated from the possessor
of that right. For cultural property rights, there is an assumption of full
alienability predicated on heterogeneity and fragmentation. However, even
within the artificial construct of property rights, there is a recognized concept
of "market inalienability."'
Currently, the "property" aspect of "cultural property" has been the
focus of legal attention to the exclusion of its corollary term "cultural." When
one looks at a Thai Buddhist statue merely as a physical object and ignores its
cultural dimensionality, it is easy to objectify the object, to commodify and
market it. An education stepped in deontological ethics should equip one to
comprehend cultural property as inexorably bound up within the agency of its
seamless cultural web. This enterprise is the ability to intuit cultural property
no longer as "raw" (that is, to assume that an art piece's meaning is severable
from its producing culture) but as "cooked" per Claude Levi-Strauss' classic
treatise on the necessary cultural conveyance of meaning in art. 14 2 When this
is achieved, then the statute is constitutive of cultural achievement and
142 CLAUDE Lvi-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED: INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF
MYTHOLOGY I (John & Doreen Weightman trans., Harper & Row 1969).
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relationships; indeed, it is the culture. This associative process places the
immediately-accessible and thereby objectifiable art piece within the
framework of the non-dimensional and inter-subjective field of social and
human environment.
Stephen Greenblatt, in his "abjurations" for cultural understanding put
it succinctly: "There can be no expression without an origin and an object, a
from and a for.' 143 With such perspective, it is as antipathetic to think of
"owning" a Thai Buddhist statue as it would be to think of "owning" the Thai
culture. Likewise, an alien "using" of such art becomes conceptually
unworkable and problematized. This perspective has been achieved to an
inspiring extent with natural resources: an individuated resource (for example,
old-growth timber) is now located or fully situated as an extricable part of its
producing environment (the forest ecosystem.) Without the part, the whole
ceases to be; without the whole, the part has no meaning. It is time to nurture
this understanding toward the creations that comprise cultural property and to
their intrinsic role in cultural and social flourishing.
143 Stephen Greenblatt, Towards a Poetics of Culture, in THE NEW HISTORICISM 12 (H. Aram Veeser
ed. 1989).
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